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Executive Summary
The way the political parties select their presidential candidates has changed dramatically over
the course of the United States’ history. While candidates were originally selected by party
leaders, the system has gradually become more inclusive. The voice of the average citizen was
at first nonexistent, but now voters play a direct role in candidate selection.
Still, more progress is needed. This report addresses the shortcomings of the parties’ primary
processes and explores how the primaries can result in the selection of presidential nominees
who are both the most representative of the electorate’s will and qualified to serve as the
nation’s leader.

A More Equitable Primary Calendar
The calendar of presidential primary contests gives voters in states hosting the earliest
presidential primaries and caucuses disproportionate influence in the selection of presidential
nominees. The demographics of these early voting states are not representative of the country
as a whole.
We recommend a new approach to determining the order of presidential primaries. Our
proposed calendar would begin with a day of voting on which one small state from each of the
country’s four regions would cast its votes. Each of the subsequent weeks of voting would
include states of varying sizes from different regions. To give as many voters as possible an
opportunity to have a meaningful say, there would be a limit on the percent of delegates that
could be at stake on any given day of voting. The announcement of when each state would hold
its primary would not occur until the December preceding the primaries, which would prevent
candidates from spending a disproportionate amount of time and money courting voters from
early voting states.

More Informative Primary Debates
Primary debates should provide voters with information about candidates’ plans for the
country. But debates in recent election cycles have fallen short of their potential. The events
have often become media spectacles instead of substantive dialogues. Candidates’
performances are graded more based on style over substance, and most substantive aspects of
debates are reduced to soundbites. Some topics receive disproportionate attention, leading to
repetitive exchanges. Many debates involve so many candidates that it becomes impossible for
any candidate to adequately explain his or her policy positions.
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We propose removing television networks, which can be more interested in ratings than policy
discussions, from the process of planning debates. Instead, the political parties should
coordinate with the candidates to organize the debates. The pool of potential moderators
should expand beyond news anchors and journalists to include other experts, such as
historians. To encourage candidates to take less performative, more policy-focused approaches,
there should not be in-person audiences. Additionally, candidates should be guaranteed set
amounts of time to discuss their ideas.

Eliminating Caucuses
Caucuses are meetings where local political party members declare their support for their
preferred presidential candidates. State political parties use different rules for caucuses, but
caucuses typically involve participants advocating for their candidates to other caucus-goers
and physically grouping together based on candidate preferences. While caucuses give some
citizens a unique opportunity to engage in participatory democracy, they are difficult to
administer and have several drawbacks, including flaws that make it hard for many citizens to
participate. Attending a caucus is far more time consuming than casting a ballot in a primary,
and the timing of caucuses—several hours on a given weeknight—creates challenges for people
who have conflicting work, childcare, or other commitments. Caucuses also deprive participants
of their ability to keep their candidate preferences secret. Accordingly, the political parties
should eliminate caucuses and replace them with primary elections.

Opening Primaries to Independent Voters
A majority of states host presidential primaries, which permit voters to anonymously cast their
votes at polling places or by mail. Some states permit all registered voters to vote in any
presidential primary, while other states only permit individuals who have belonged a political
party for a certain period of time to participate. The rules for who may participate in primaries
substantially impact the representativeness of a state’s pool of primary voters. Primaries should
be opened to permit participation by independent voters. Fully closed primaries, which only
permit registered party members to participate, tend to lead to the selection of more partisan
presidential nominees whose views may not represent the party as a whole.

Ensuring Majority Support for Nominees
In some cases, a presidential candidate receives their party’s nomination with only plurality
support from primary voters. Such a candidate is not likely to adequately represent the views of
party members. The parties should use ranked-choice voting, a method in which voters “rank”
the candidates participating in an election to ensure that the prevailing candidate has secured a
majority of votes in the primary. If at first no candidate secures a majority of the votes, the
candidate who receives the fewest votes is eliminated from consideration. That candidate’s
votes are then redistributed to the voters’ second-choice candidate. This process would
continue until a candidate received a majority of the votes, ensuring that the candidate who
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receives a party’s presidential nomination is supported, even if not as a first choice, by a
majority of a party’s voters.

Balancing the Input of Voters and Party Establishments
“Peer review” is input by party leaders on who may become a party’s presidential nominee. A
lack of peer review may lead to the selection of an unqualified candidate who is able to
mobilize a large number of voters but who does not represent the party’s platform or political
goals. One way the political parties can exert “peer review” is by permitting superdelegates—
unpledged, elected party elites—to participate in the selection of a presidential candidate at
the parties’ national conventions. In 2019, the Democratic Party limited the role that
superdelegates could play during its 2020 national convention, permitting superdelegates to
influence the selection of their party’s candidate only if no candidate had secured a majority of
delegates pledged through primaries and caucuses. We endorse this reform because it is an
appropriate manner for party elites to promote the selection of a presidential candidate who is
viable and qualified while preserving the crucial role of voters.

3
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Introduction
A voter in Iowa misses her chance to caucus after getting out of work too late.1 A voter in New
York chooses not to vote in her state’s primary, convinced that, so late in the primary calendar,
her voice would not matter anyway.2 A voter sitting at home, unsure of who to vote for in her
state’s upcoming primary, tunes in to the latest debate only to watch a media circus unfold as
candidates fight to attract the most attention.3 These are only a few examples that illustrate the
serious, consistent problems with the current system of presidential primaries and caucuses in
the United States.
The current primary calendar values the votes of some citizens over the votes of all citizens.
States’ broad discretion to choose whether to host caucuses or primaries and whether to
permit voters not registered to a major political party to participate in primary elections creates
the potential for more problems. States mishandling their discretion on these issues can
decrease voter turnout and create openings for politically extreme candidates to be nominated
for the presidency. In some states, a candidate who has only received a plurality of the votes
may prevail, giving the candidate a majority of the party’s delegates for a state, even though a
majority of voters in the contest do not necessarily support that candidate. The current
structure of primary debates often prevents informative exchanges on policy issues and
sometimes favors well-known candidates over well-qualified candidates. Finally, elected party
members play a controversial role in “peer reviewing” candidates, by endorsing and supporting
certain presidential candidates.
We recommend several reforms to the existing primary system aimed at ensuring that the
system nominates the most representative and qualified candidates from each party. First, the
primary calendar should be reformed so that no day of voting is so large it dwarfs other
contests, and so that as many voters as possible can have a meaningful vote. Second, debates
should be structured to be more informative for voters. Third, caucuses should be eliminated in
favor of primaries. Fourth, state political parties should hold semi-open primaries that allow
some voters who are not registered members of the parties to participate. Fifth, primary
contests should use ranked-choice voting to ensure that candidates win by majorities, not
pluralities. Finally, the preferences of party elites, or superdelegates, should only be given

1

Elaine Godfrey, Iowans Vote First, If They Can Vote at All, ATLANTIC (Oct. 7, 2019),
https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2019/10/iowa-satellite-caucus-democrats-voting-rights/598999/.
2
Matthew Schuerman, Why NY and NJ Voters Are Stuck With FOMO on the Presidential Primary, GOTHAMIST (Jan.
27, 2020, 4:00 AM), https://gothamist.com/news/why-ny-and-nj-voters-primary.
3
Edward-Isaac Dovere, The Democratic Debates Aren’t Pleasing Anyone, ATLANTIC (Sept. 19, 2019),
https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2019/09/2020-democratic-debates-arent-pleasing-anyone/598306/.
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greater weight than those of rank-and-file voters if a candidate does not secure a majority of
delegates in the first vote at the national convention.
This report begins with an overview of the primary system’s history before analyzing the
system’s flaws and elaborating on our reform recommendations.

I. History & Context
The American presidential primary system evolved over centuries, from the framers’ vision for
how the nation would choose presidents, to the creation of primaries and caucuses, to the shift
following the 1968 Democratic National Convention, and finally to the modern system used in
both the 2016 and 2020 presidential primaries.

The Founding Era
After escaping the rule of King George III, the Constitution’s framers set about creating a new
form of government, one in which the president would have far less power than a monarch.4
The framers had not envisioned anything like the primary system the United States has today.
In Federalist Papers Nos. 10 and 51, James Madison underscored both the importance of
mediating popular democratic ideals through wise leaders and the necessity of limiting the
power of government through internal competition.5 Written in 1787 and 1788 respectively,
the Federalist Papers give insight into the rationale behind the framers’ decisions and suggest
they would view the current primary system as too unmanaged, with the need for additional
oversight that prevents the rise of unqualified demagogues, without taking too much decision
making power from the electorate.6

Progressive Era
Beginning in 1800, members of Congress would meet with their respective political parties to
choose the parties’ presidential candidates.7 This process faced criticism for disrupting the
balance of powers between the executive and legislative branches.8

4

See, e.g., THE FEDERALIST NO. 69 (Alexander Hamilton).
Id.
6
See id.
7
See ROBERT E. DICLERICO & JAMES W. DAVIS, CHOOSING OUR CHOICES: DEBATING THE PRESIDENTIAL NOMINATING PROCESS 4
(2000).
8
See Nominating Presidents, U.S. SENATE,
https://www.senate.gov/artandhistory/history/minute/Nominating_presidents.htm.
5
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By 1820, the flaws with this system became apparent.9 That year, the Federalist Party ceased to
be a viable party and did not nominate a candidate for president, leaving DemocraticRepublican James Monroe to run unopposed for a second term.10 Even as the only remaining
national party, the Democratic-Republicans faced challenges during the 1824 nominating
process.11 The press, state legislatures, and politically involved citizens were tired of Congress
having the sole power to select presidential nominees, and they protested the process as
unconstitutional.12 The Democratic-Republican Party went to war with itself over the issue,
effectively ending the Congressional Caucus era.13
In 1832, the Party Conventions era began.14 During this period, the parties held national
conventions that convened representatives of the parties from across the country to determine
their nominees.15 This transferred the nomination power from members of Congress to state
parties.16
The states were not consistent in the way they chose their delegates for the conventions.17 In
some states, the governor or a state party official appointed the delegates.18 Other states held
local caucuses that chose representatives to send to county caucuses where caucus-goers
would select delegates to the state caucus, which would then choose delegates to send to the
national convention. No matter the method a state employed, delegates represented only their
state, and were not bound to a particular candidate.19
The parties intended national conventions to be a more open and democratic way to choose
their nominees.20 However, as the 20th century began, many Americans became disillusioned
with this manner of nomination.21 They saw the system as being rife with potential for
manipulation by the parties and candidates.22 These sentiments created space for the
progressives to advocate for more direct voter involvement in the nomination process.23 But

9

See BARBARA NORRANDER, THE IMPERFECT PRIMARY: ODDITIES, BIASES, AND STRENGTHS OF U.S. PRESIDENTIAL NOMINATION
POLITICS 11 (2d ed. 2015).
10
See id.
11
See id.
12
See William J. Morgan, The Decline of the Congressional Nominating Caucus, 24 TENN. HISTORICAL Q. 245, 250-51
(1965).
13
See id. at 253-54.
14
See id. at 255.
15
See NORRANDER, supra note 9, at 12.
16
See id.
17
See id.
18
See id.; see also DICLERICO & DAVIS, supra note 7, at 5.
19
See NORRANDER, supra note 9, at 12; see also DICLERICO & DAVIS, supra note 7, at 5.
20
See NORRANDER, supra note 9, at 12-13.
21
See DICLERICO & DAVIS, supra note 7, at 4-5.
22
See id. at 5.
23
See id.
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party leaders were skeptical of giving weight to voters’ preferences. They believed primaries
were too expensive and that voter turnout was too low.24
Despite party leaders’ hesitation, there was a shift toward more direct modes of voting in the
primaries, but the parties still effectively controlled the selection of the majority of delegates to
the conventions.25 States’ primary results were not binding on delegates, who were not
required to vote for the candidate who won the state’s primary.26 The main purpose of
primaries and caucuses in this era was to tell convention delegates about candidates’ popularity
in the states that held the contests.

1968 Democratic Convention
The familiar American presidential nominee selection process, in which voters’ preferences are
given significant weight, only began after the 1968 Democratic Convention in Chicago, Illinois.
In 1968, Senator Eugene McCarthy, a vocal opponent of the Vietnam War, challenged President
Lyndon B. Johnson in the New Hampshire Democratic Primary.27 McCarthy’s run prompted
Senator Robert F. Kennedy to enter the race and, soon after, on March 31, 1968, President
Johnson announced he would not seek re-election.28 His vice president, Hubert Humphrey, who
was part of the political establishment many Americans had been protesting throughout the
1960s, then declared his candidacy.29 While Kennedy and McCarthy participated in multiple
primaries, Humphrey chose not to participate in any because he had inherited Johnson’s
delegates. In fact, 25 percent of all delegates to the 1968 Democratic Convention had already
been chosen in 1967 by Johnson supporters who automatically threw their support behind
Humphrey when Johnson dropped out.30
When Kennedy was assassinated after winning the California primary, the competition
narrowed to only McCarthy and Humphrey.31 Party elites nominated Humphrey, who had not
won a single primary; Humphrey received 1,759.25 delegate votes to McCarthy’s 601.32 Massive

24

See id. at 5-6.
See Stephen Gardbaum & Richard Pildes, Populism and Institutional Design: Methods of Selecting Candidates for
Chief Executive, 93 N.Y.U. L. REV. 647, 655-56 (2018).
26
See NORRANDER, supra note 9, at 14-15.
27
See ELAINE KAMARCK, PRIMARY POLITICS: EVERYTHING YOU NEED TO KNOW ABOUT HOW AMERICA NOMINATES ITS PRESIDENTIAL
CANDIDATES 11-13 (3d ed. 2018).
28
Id.
29
Id. at 13.
30
Id. at 14.
31
See Tim Arango, A Campaign, a Murder, a Legacy: Robert F. Kennedy’s California Story, N.Y. TIMES (June 5, 2018),
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/06/05/us/robert-kennedy-california.html.
32
David Hinckley, ‘Chicago 1968’ the Most Controversial Convention of Them All, N.Y. DAILY NEWS (Aug. 21, 2008,
10:47 AM), https://www.nydailynews.com/news/politics/chicago-1968-controversial-convention-article-1.315416.
25
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violent protests erupted outside the August 1968 Democratic Convention.33 The Democrats left
the convention deeply divided, and Republican Richard Nixon won the presidency in a landslide
that November.34
During the convention, party officials, desperate for a peace offering to the protestors, had
promised to create a reform commission to examine the party’s nominating process. The
McGovern-Fraser Commission, led by South Dakota Senator George McGovern and Minneapolis
Mayor Donald Fraser, conducted hearings and meetings throughout 1969 on how to transform
the presidential nomination system.35
The commission ultimately issued a report. The first part of the report mandated requirements
for state parties because “[i]n at least twenty states, there were no (or inadequate) rules for
the selection of Convention delegates, leaving the entire process to the discretion of a handful
of party leaders.”36 These requirements included publicly notifying voters of how the delegate
system works, eliminating the unit rule37 and proxy voting, and mandating procedural
regularities in delegate selection across states.38 Most importantly, these procedural
regularities included binding delegates to support whichever candidate won their respective
state’s primary.39 The second part of the report listed suggestions for state parties that
encouraged more diversity in both delegate selection and general election participation.40
These reforms were adopted by the Democratic National Committee for the 1972 election
cycle.41 In the Republican party, similar reforms occurred as a result of the Republican National
Committee’s 1968 Committee on Delegates and Organization.42 Both parties’ reforms shifted
the nominating power from the hands of party elites to the hands of the electorate.

Evolution of the Primary System In 2008, 2016, & 2020
Since the reforms of the 1970s, it has become increasingly important for primary candidates to
appeal and spread their messages directly to voters, not just to party leaders. During this time,
the internet has become increasingly ubiquitous in every aspect of life, which has made it easier

33

1968 Democratic National Convention: A ‘Week of Hate’, BBC (Aug. 27, 2018),
https://www.bbc.com/news/world-us-canada-45226132.
34
Id.
35
See KAMARCK, supra note 27, at 13-14.
36
117 CONG. REC. 32907, 32909 (1971).
37
Id. at 32912 (“. . . a practice by which a majority of a meeting or delegation can bind a dissenting minority to vote
in accordance with the wishes of the majority.”).
38
Id. at 32914-15.
39
Id.
40
See id. at 32913.
41
KAMARCK, supra note 27, at 14.
42
Id. at 19.
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for presidential candidates to directly appeal to voters. All presidential candidates now have
accounts on social media platforms, permitting them to directly communicate and engage with
voters, who can passionately follow their preferred candidates and receive updates on the
candidates’ activities and opinions in real time. Candidates’ strategic and candid use of social
media to communicate with one another and voters has opened a pathway for insurgent
presidential candidates who are not political insiders to gain and mobilize significant support.
President Barack Obama’s use of social media and technology was critical in his successful 2008
campaign.43 In fact, his direct communication with potential voters helped him gain popularity
and defeat Hillary Clinton, a well-known establishment candidate, in a close primary race.44
The 2016 presidential primaries and general election marked a notable shift toward rejecting
established party figures and supporting outsider candidates, like Donald Trump and Bernie
Sanders, who mobilized voters through direct and impassioned communication. During the
2016 campaign, more voters read the social media posts of Donald Trump and Hillary Clinton
for updates about the election than visited their campaign websites or subscribed to receive
emails from them.45 Trump received significant media attention for his inflammatory tweets.46
Although Clinton’s campaign spent almost twice what Trump’s campaign spent throughout the
2016 presidential primaries and general election, Trump’s barrage of unfiltered tweets earned
him approximately $5 billion in free media coverage during the 2016 presidential election cycle,
which helped him secure the Republican nomination and win the presidency.47
In 2020, the strategic use of social media and technology continued to be important tools for
candidates from outside the party establishment to gain momentum. For example, former
Mayor of South Bend, Indiana, Pete Buttigieg, was relatively unknown to the American public
prior to the 2020 primary. But “Mayor Pete” became popular on Twitter, earning support from
many small donors, which helped him remain a viable candidate who was able to compete with
well-known and established Democratic politicians.48

43

See Aaron Smith, The Internet’s Role in Campaign 2008, PEW RES. CENTER (Apr. 15, 2009),
https://www.pewresearch.org/internet/2009/04/15/the-internets-role-in-campaign-2008/.
44
See David Carr, How Obama Tapped Into Social Networks’ Power, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 9, 2008),
https://www.nytimes.com/2008/11/10/business/media/10carr.html.
45
PEW RESEARCH CENTER, ELECTION 2016: CAMPAIGNS AS A DIRECT SOURCE OF NEWS 13 (July 18, 2016),
https://www.journalism.org/wp-content/uploads/sites/8/2016/07/PJ_2016.07.18_election-2016_FINAL.pdf.
46
Amanda Hess, How Trump Wins Twitter, SLATE (Feb. 18, 2016, 1:04 PM),
https://slate.com/technology/2016/02/donald-trump-is-the-best-at-twitter-heres-why.html.
47
See Christopher Ingraham, Somebody Just Put a Price Tag on the 2016 Election. It’s a Doozy, WASH. POST (Apr. 14,
2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/wonk/wp/2017/04/14/somebody-just-put-a-price-tag-on-the2016-election-its-a-doozy/.
48
See Issie Lapowsky, In the 2020 Race, What Is the Value of Social Media Stardom, WIRED (Apr. 17, 2019, 5:48
PM), https://www.wired.com/story/2020-race-democrats-social-media-stardom/.
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In sum, the American presidential primary system, once exclusive to party elites, has become
highly nationalized and voter-centric. Outsider candidates now communicate directly and
frequently with American voters, running increasingly successful campaigns that challenge wellfunded, established candidates. Despite these changes to a seemingly more democratic system,
problems persist in modern primaries.

II. Recommendations for Reform
This Part presents our recommendations for (1) reorganizing the calendar for when states hold
their primary contests; (2) improving primary debates; (3) ending caucuses; (4) allowing
independent voters to participate in primaries; (5) implementing ranked-choice voting to
ensure that candidates win majority support in primary elections; and (6) striking a balance
between the input of voters and the party establishments in selecting nominees.

A More Equitable Primary Calendar
The current primary calendar causes votes cast in early voting states to have more weight than
votes cast later in the primary season.49 The first contests, which currently occur in Iowa, New
Hampshire, Nevada, and South Carolina, dominate national media coverage for months50 and
impact how voters nationwide think about the candidates. These four early states also narrow
the field of candidates before voters in later states get the opportunity to cast their votes.51
However, the four earliest states are not the only states where certain voters can have a
disproportionately large influence on the selection of a presidential candidate.52 Recognizing
the power of an early place in the calendar, some states have scheduled their primaries almost
immediately after the first four states’ contests to maximize their voters’ influence. This
phenomenon of “frontloading” leads to an enormous number of delegates being concentrated
early in the process of selecting a presidential nominee.53
To attain the impact they desire, frontloading states cluster together on voting days where
huge amounts of delegates are in play, such as Super Tuesday.54 In 2020, only 3.9 percent of

49

Travis N. Ridout & Brandon Rottinghaus, The Importance of Being Early: Presidential Primary Front-Loading and
the Impact of the Proposed Western Regional Primary, 41 PS: POL. SCI. AND POL. 123, 123 (2008).
50
See NORRANDER, supra note 9, at 117; John Haskell, Reforming Presidential Primaries: Three Steps for Improving
the Campaign Environment, 26 PRESIDENTIAL STUD. Q. 380, 384 (1996); Sam Reed & Deb Markowitz, No Way to Pick a
President, RIPON F. (April-May 2007), https://www.riponsociety.org/article/no-way-to-pick-a-president-2/.
51
See Wayne P. Steger, Andrew J. Dowdle & Randall E. Adkins, The New Hampshire Effect in Presidential
Nominations, 57 POL. RES. Q. 375, 376 (2004).
52
See NORRANDER, supra note 9, at 120-21.
53
See id. at 121; KAMARCK, supra note 27, at 58.
54
See NORRANDER, supra note 9, at 121.
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delegates were at stake before the early-March Super Tuesday contests.55 On Super Tuesday
2020, held only two days after the South Carolina primary, 34.1 percent of delegates were at
stake.56 A massive number of delegates was at stake on a single day, yet the media and
candidates had spent most of the prior months mostly focusing on Iowa, New Hampshire,
Nevada, and South Carolina. Candidates needed strong showings in those first four states to be
competitive in all of the 15 Super Tuesday contests. This dynamic requires candidates to raise
considerable amounts of money before the primary season even begins in order to be
competitive in the first four states.57
The outsized importance of the first four states, which are not representative of the country’s
diversity or of either party, may lead to candidates dropping out before they could realize
success in other states.58 Iowa is 91 percent white, while New Hampshire is even less diverse,
with a population that is 93 percent white.59 The demographics of the early states may skew
which candidates remain in the race.60 And, as a result, a party’s eventual nominee may not be
representative of his or her party, but merely of the populations of the states that scheduled
their primaries at the start of the calendar.61
Despite the large impact of frontloading, the primary calendar extends for many months.62 In
2016, the calendar started with the Iowa Caucus on February 1 and stretched to June 14, when
the Democratic primary took place in Washington, D.C.63 Some candidates had announced their
candidacies as early as March 2015.64

55

See Democratic Delegate Rules, 2020, BALLOTPEDIA, https://ballotpedia.org/Democratic_delegate_rules,_2020.
Id.
57
See Reed & Markowitz, supra note 50.
58
See Dennis F. Thompson, The Primary Purpose of Presidential Primaries, 125 POL. SCI. Q. 205, 219-21 (2010); see
also NORRANDER, supra note 9, at 129.
59
See Ian Milhiser, Why New Hampshire’s Primary Should Not Be the First Primary, in One Chart, VOX (Feb. 11,
2020), https://www.vox.com/2020/2/11/21134165/new-hampshire-not-first-one-chart-white-people.
60
See Thompson, supra note 58, at 219-21; NORRANDER, supra note 9, at 129; KAMARCK, supra note 27, at 56-57.
61
See NORRANDER, supra note 9, at 121.
62
See Alicia Parlapiano, How Presidential Campaigns Became Two-Year Marathons, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 16, 2015),
https://www.nytimes.com/2015/04/17/upshot/how-presidential-campaigns-became-two-year-marathons.html.
63
See Election 2016 Calendar: Primaries and Caucuses, NPR (Feb. 17, 2016, 2:41 PM),
https://www.npr.org/2016/01/26/464430411/election-2016-calendar-primaries-and-caucuses.
64
See Nick Corasaniti & Patrick Healy, Ted Cruz Becomes First Major Candidate to Announce Presidential Bid for
2016, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 23, 2015), https://www.nytimes.com/2015/03/24/us/politics/ted-cruz-2016-presidentialrace.html.
56
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1. Existing Proposals
There are several prominent existing proposals for reforming the primary calendar, including
plans for a national primary, a rotating regional primary, and a system known as the Delaware
Plan, where states would vote in order of their size, from smallest to largest.
a) National Primary
A national primary would involve every state holding both parties’ primaries on the same day.65
This proposal would give each voter an equal opportunity to influence the selection of his or
her party’s nominee.66 Additionally, all voters would be able to choose from the same slate of
candidates because there would be no prior contests to eliminate contenders from the field.67
Critics of this proposal argue that it would benefit the candidate with the most name
recognition and deepest pockets.68 A national primary day would eliminate the opportunity for
lesser-known candidates to build momentum with early wins.69 Campaigning toward a single
contest would likely rely heavily on television and online advertising instead of retail politicking,
which traditionally involves candidates interacting with individual voters and small groups.70
Candidates would put their resources into the states with the most delegates, ignoring rural
areas and smaller states during the campaign.71 Party leaders also fear that a large field of
candidates in a national primary would allow a candidate to win the nomination with plurality
support. A primary that ended with a nominee who did not come close to obtaining majority
support could tear a party apart rather than unifying it.72
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b) Regional Rotating Primary
A rotating regional primary would split the country into four regions, with each region voting on
the first Tuesday of every month from March until June.73 Some versions of the proposal would
have Iowa and New Hampshire retain their positions at the start of the calendar before the
regional primaries began.74 Proponents of a regional primary contend that confining campaigns
to one region at a time would make them more manageable and could make prospective
candidates more willing to run for president.75 Additionally, proponents suggest the system
would allow candidates to bypass issues that are specific to very few states, such as the ethanol
tax’s relevance in Iowa,76 and instead address only national and regional issues.77
Although there may be environmental and convenience value in holding regional primaries, this
proposal would probably do little to address the problems the current calendar poses. There is
a clear advantage in voting early in the primary cycle, and giving one region the opportunity to
vote first would disadvantage the others.78 This proposal would also hurt candidates who do
not relate well to the voters in the first region, but who may have many supporters elsewhere
in the country.79 Regional primaries would put a large number of delegates at stake on the first
day of voting, which could result in a presumptive nominee without any other part of the
country having an opportunity to weigh in.80
c) Delaware Plan
The Delaware Plan was proposed in 1999 by the Republican Party’s Advisory Commission on
the Presidential Nominating Process.81 This plan groups states by population size and puts the
smallest states, such as Delaware, on the first day of voting.82 That first day of voting would be
held during the first week in March.83 Then, on set days over the next three months, groups of
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gradually larger states would vote.84 The final group, which would include the largest states,
would represent nearly 50 percent of all delegates at stake in the primaries.85
Proponents of the Delaware Plan assert that allocating a majority of delegates to the last day of
voting would prevent a presumptive nominee from emerging before voters in every state had
had a chance to cast their ballots.86 This would allow most, if not all, voters to have a real say in
choosing the nominee.87 Additionally, by letting the smaller states vote first, the plan would still
allow for retail politicking, which permits the candidates with less money and name recognition
to gain momentum and have a chance at the nomination.
Critics contend that the plan does not prevent early states from having disproportionate
influence.88 And granting small states outsized influence is made worse by the fact that they
tend to be less diverse than larger states and the country as a whole.89 The Delaware Plan could
create a two-step process, with candidates using the first step to concentrate on gaining early
victories and momentum in the eyes of the media and then using the second to focus on
accumulating delegates. These two steps would still allow the first states to vote to eliminate
many of the candidates and give later states less of a choice.90
2. Our Recommendation
Our recommendation seeks to give the most citizens possible the opportunity to cast a
meaningful vote, while giving all candidates the opportunity to introduce themselves to the
electorate, gain momentum, and raise campaign funds. We recommend removing Iowa, New
Hampshire, South Carolina, and Nevada as the first states to vote in the primaries. Instead, four
states would vote on the first Tuesday in March, one from each region of the country
(Northeast/Mid-Atlantic, South, Midwest, and West).91 Each state in this first group would be a
“small state” with no more than 45 delegates in the Democratic primary and no more than 35
delegates in the Republican primary.92
On December 1, the national parties would hold separate lotteries to choose one state from
each of these regions to hold a primary on the first day of the primaries. Although the states
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chosen by each party would be different, the first day of voting would remain the same. A state
chosen to vote first in a particular primary cycle could not vote first in a subsequent cycle until
every “small state” from its region had been chosen to vote first. A few days after the
December 1 lottery, the national parties would announce the rest of the primary schedule. Any
state that attempted to change its dictated day of voting would not only have its delegates
taken away, but would automatically be given the last day of voting in the next election cycle.
When organizing the rest of the primary calendar, each national party would be able to
schedule as many states on a given day as it wanted, up to a certain percentage of the total
delegates at stake in the primaries. The national parties could choose to coordinate when
states vote or construct their own schedules. In the second week, there could be up to 15
percent of the total delegates at stake, the third week 15 percent, the fourth week 10 percent,
the fifth week 15 percent, the sixth week 15 percent, the seventh week 15 percent, and the
eighth week 25 percent. By the fifth week, up to 50 percent of delegates could be awarded.
Although a nominee requires a majority, or over 50 percent of delegates, it is possible that an
especially dominant candidate may secure the nomination on the fifth voting day. However, in
a more competitive primary race there may not be a presumptive nominee until the final week
of voting.
The first day of voting would be the first Tuesday in March. There would be no primary the
following week, but, after the one-week break, there would be a primary every Tuesday for the
next four weeks. There would then be one week without a primary, followed by a primary every
Tuesday for the next three weeks. The gap after the first day of voting would allow campaigns
to regroup and capitalize on any momentum they gained, while ensuring that the voters in
other states have their voices heard in short order.
Below is a sample primary calendar for the Democratic Party’s primary in 2024 that follows the
recommended system:
Week 1:
March 5
(MAX 5%)

Vermont (16), Nebraska (29), New Mexico (34), District of Columbia (20) =
99 (2.4%)

Week 2
Massachusetts (91), Georgia (105), Minnesota (75), Illinois (155), Alaska (15),
March 19
Rhode Island (26), South Dakota (16), Arizona (67), North Dakota (14), Arkansas
(MAX 15%) (31) = 595 (14.9%)
Week 3
New York (274), North Carolina (110), Wisconsin (84), Louisiana (54) =
March 26
522 (13.1%)
(MAX 15%)
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Week 1:
March 5
(MAX 5%)

Vermont (16), Nebraska (29), New Mexico (34), District of Columbia (20) =
99 (2.4%)

Week 4:
Virginia (99), Connecticut (60), Montana (19), South Carolina (54), Maine (24),
April 2
Wyoming (14), New Hampshire (24), Guam (7), Virgin Islands (7), American
(MAX 10%) Samoa (6) = 314 (7.8%)
Week 5:
Texas (228), Maryland (96), Idaho (20), Mississippi (36), Colorado (67) =
April 9
447 (11.2%)
(MAX 15%)
Week 6:
California (415), Delaware (21), Utah (29), Michigan (125) = 590 (14.8%)
April 23
(MAX 15%)
Week 7:
Ohio (136), Washington (89), Florida (219), Indiana (82), West Virginia (28)
April 30
Democrats Abroad (13) = 567 (14.2%)
(MAX 15%)
Week 8:
Pennsylvania (186), New Jersey (126), Puerto Rico (51), Tennessee (64), Oregon
May 6
(61), Missouri (68), Northern Mariana (6), Hawaii (24), Alabama (52), Iowa (41),
(MAX 25%) Nevada (36), Oklahoma (37), Kansas (39), Kentucky (54) = 845 (21.2%)
Our proposed reforms to the primary calendar are not without potential drawbacks, but the
reforms would provide a substantial improvement on the current system. It is inevitable that
the first states to vote will have an outsized effect on the primary, particularly because media
coverage emphasizes the “horse race.” However, changing the states that go first in each
primary cycle allows for different voters to set off the beginning phase of the primaries.
Currently, Iowa and New Hampshire dominate the news for months, making it only natural that
candidates who are more attractive to voters in those states seem more viable to the whole
country. This recommended calendar may also change the way the media tracks the race, by
hypothetically having eight different states vote on the same day (if Republicans and Democrats
drew completely different states), the media could no longer highlight one state as a
“kingmaker.” Using December 1, which is approximately three months before the first primary
date, as the date to announce which four states will vote first prevents campaigns from having
boots on the ground in the first states months or years in advance. This delay would help lesserknown and lesser-funded candidates be more competitive. This delayed announcement also
might reign in the disproportionate amount of money candidates spend in the first few states,
and allow for spending to be distributed among more states. The announcement date may not
stop candidates from declaring their candidacies as early as they do now, but it may encourage
candidates to hone their national messages before their appeals become more focused on the
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first states. Some may contend that three months is too quick for states to set-up their
elections. But the states that qualify to vote first would know that they could be chosen and
could prepare accordingly.
Larger states may object that smaller states would still vote first. However, for the field to
consist of more than just the well-known or well-funded candidates, there should be an
opportunity for “retail politics.” Connecting and interacting with individual voters is less
expensive and more easily achievable in a small state. Little known and less well-funded
candidates would be at a significant disadvantage in the larger states where support is gained
more through advertising and large rallies than individual interactions. The proposed calendar
preserves opportunities for candidates to interact directly with voters while allowing different
regions of the country to be represented on the first voting day.
The lack of diversity in many small states is a significant drawback of starting the primary
calendar with those states. But that flaw is partially addressed by limiting the percentage of
delegates at stake on each primary day, which helps encourage campaigns to appeal to diverse
groups of voters. This also ensures the primary is not over before the majority of voters have a
chance to cast a meaningful vote. The national parties could choose different kinds of states to
reach the maximum percentage allocated per day in order to get a diverse and balanced
contest.
The proposed schedule could face criticism for being too fast paced. Although our proposed
calendar ends earlier than the current calendar, it may delay having a presumptive nominee
until later in the cycle, which could be precarious for a party facing a powerful incumbent. A
longer wait for a presumptive nominee could limit time for fundraising and consolidating
support behind the nominee. But allowing more voters to have a meaningful say in choosing
the nominee should result in a candidate who voters across the country can enthusiastically
rally behind and support financially.

More Informative Primary Debates
The numerous debates between candidates for their parties’ presidential nominations often fail
to live up to their potential for informing voters. The debates are typically organized through
collaborations between television networks and the political parties. Federal Election
Commission regulations dictate only structural aspects of presidential debates. For example,
only non-profit organizations or broadcasters that are not controlled by a political party,
political committee, or candidate can host debates and dictate polling criteria the candidates
must meet to participate.93 But the apparent purpose of these rules—encouraging neutrality—
is often undermined, as increasingly partisan news networks typically serve as organizers. The
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debates have become counterproductive to furthering the goal of nominating representative
and qualified candidates.94
Criticism of the current debate structure includes disapproval of “mass debates” with so many
candidates that each only has minutes to make their case to voters;95 the networks’ priority of
attracting viewers, not informing voters;96 and questioning that rapidly jumps through topics
and gives disproportionate attention to certain topics.97 The focus on performance over
substance makes it hard for voters to understand candidates’ positions.98 The use of polling to
determine which candidates qualify to participate in the debates is also detrimental.
Candidates’ standing in polls can be influenced by name recognition, which can come from
involvement in debates. The relationship between polling success and debate participation can
create a cycle where qualified candidates are consistently excluded in favor of those who
deliver the highest ratings.99
1. Existing Proposals
Multiple proposals already exist to reform the primary debates. First, to address criticisms that
debates are geared more toward being entertaining than informative, proposals call for
replacing celebrity news anchors with ordinary citizens100 or eliminating large audiences.101
Audiences, critics assert, incentivize candidates to “grandstand and ignore moderators, while
encouraging the journalists to cover the audience’s reaction more than what the candidates are
saying.”102 To address criticism that debates do not give candidates enough time to respond to
a multitude of questions on a wide array of subjects, proposals call for allowing candidates to
respond with longer answers that highlight their platforms at a slower pace.103
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2. Our Recommendation
Drawing on these existing proposals, we recommend overhauling the debates to make them
informative and substantive events during which candidates explain their platforms in detail.
The focus by networks and candidates on soundbites and performance allows fringe candidates
to attract significant support without engaging in serious policy discussions.
The debates should be planned by political parties in conjunction with candidates, instead of
television networks, because the event is, after all, an opportunity for candidates to spread
their messages. Networks too often seem more interested in achieving high ratings than
fostering substantive policy discussions. Without networks producing the debates, the pool of
moderators could expand beyond journalists to other credible experts, such as historians, as
the Annenberg Working Group on Presidential Campaign Debate Reform suggested.104
Access to debates for viewers should be expanded to allow as many Americans as possible to
watch, both during and after the broadcasts. If the rights to debates were not owned by
networks, the broadcasts could be viewed on a universally accessible online feed. Organizers
could also post clips of important discussions of policy proposals by candidates once a debate is
over, another recommendation from the Annenberg Working Group.105
Debates should be structured with the same audience-less format as the March 2020 debate
between Joe Biden and Bernie Sanders. Voters’ takeaways from a debate without audiences is
determined “less by how the candidates performed and more by what they said.”106
Candidates’ time for answers should be controlled by the “Chess Clock” model, in which they
would have a set amount of speaking time to allocate however they choose. This model would
allow candidates to go into greater detail on policy issues that are important to them.107
We recommend maintaining polling requirements as part of the criteria for candidates to
qualify for participation in debates. Given that the number of primary candidates in both
parties has swelled in recent cycles, there is a need to keep the number of candidates on
debate stages manageable. Polling requirements are the best way to keep debates focused on
the most viable candidates. The proposed debate format would highlight qualified candidates
who are able to thoroughly explain their ideas and proposals to the American people.
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Eliminating Caucuses
The political parties should eliminate caucuses because they are difficult to administer and
create hurdles to citizen participation. State political parties currently have a choice between
hosting caucuses or primaries to award their states’ delegates. Caucuses are local meetings
where registered party members declare their support for their chosen candidates.108 Caucuses
do not always follow the same rules. The 2020 Iowa caucuses illustrate the divergent
approaches that state political parties can take. Republican caucus-goers simply wrote their
choices on ballots, while the Democratic contest used a far more complex process. At each
caucus site, Democratic caucus-goers gathered in groups based on their chosen candidates. If a
candidate did not attract the support of 15 percent of the caucus-goers at a given location, that
candidates’ supporters were allowed to join a different candidates’ group of supporters. All
candidates who exceeded 15 percent support were awarded delegates based on a formula.109
Proponents of caucuses hail caucuses’ uniquely democratic nature because supporters can
directly advocate for their candidates and share their political opinions with fellow caucusgoers.110 Critics argue that caucuses are undemocratic because they eliminate anonymity,
potentially putting voters at risk of manipulation; they are inconveniently timed for those who
have work or childcare obligations that prevent them from taking part in the contests that can
sometimes last for hours; they might exclude certain religious observers when held on
weekends; and they favor highly motivated voters, potentially encouraging candidates to take
more-extreme positions to appeal to these voters.111 Additionally, if voters are even one minute
late to a caucus, they might be disenfranchised.112 Turn-out is generally lower in caucuses than
in primaries for these reasons.113 There are logistical issues with how votes are counted under
certain caucus rules. When delegates are divided among multiple candidates, equations to
determine that division may lead to candidates who attract the support of many more caucusgoers than other candidates receiving similar numbers as delegates as the other candidates.114
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1. Existing Proposals
Supporters of caucuses propose introducing virtual caucuses to allow those who are unable to
attend in person to cast their vote by phone or app.115 The Iowa Democratic Party advanced a
plan for remote participation before the 2020 caucuses, hoping it would make the caucuses
more accessible and inclusive by allowing citizens who were not physically present in Iowa or
who had conflicting commitments to still cast ballots.116 Critics of the proposal asserted that it
was overly complex. They also took issue with a rule that capped the weight of remote votes at
ten percent of the overall votes in the caucuses, regardless of how many people participated
remotely.117 Regardless, the Democratic National Party rejected this proposal for
implementation in the 2020 Iowa caucus due to security concerns.118
2. Our Recommendation: Eliminate Caucuses
We recommend eliminating caucuses in favor of primaries. The benefits of shifting to primaries
in the few states that still hold caucuses is clear; primaries allow for far greater participation
among a more diverse range of citizens and they are less prone to administrative mishaps, such
as those seen in Iowa in 2020.119
The political parties should take it upon themselves to eliminate caucuses because there are
potential constitutional objections to laws banning the contests. The Supreme Court has held
that the right to associate under the First and Fourteenth Amendments extends to political
parties,120 which gives them significant leeway to determine how to select their nominees. In
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California Democratic Party v. Jones, the Court held that any burden on political parties’ right to
associate must be “narrowly tailored to serve a compelling state interest.”121
But there are plausible arguments that caucuses present constitutional problems. For example,
Heather R. Abraham argues that caucuses violate the First, Fourteenth, and Twenty-Fourth
Amendments.122 First, she asserts that “the associational rights of voters outweigh those of
party associational rights.” Second, she argues “caucuses may violate the equal protection
doctrine by allocating unequal weight to votes.” Because arbitrary discrimination can
unintentionally “[target] a suspect class” and attendance is mandatory at caucuses, there is a
risk of excluding persons based on “factors like wealth, health, and geography,” which might
violate the Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal Protection Clause.123 As the Supreme Court stated
in Bush v. Gore, “It must be remembered that the right of suffrage can be denied by a
debasement or dilution of the weight of a citizen’s vote just as effectively as by wholly
prohibiting the free exercise of the franchise.”124 Third, Abraham observes that the financial
burdens of caucuses may constitute a poll tax,” which would violate the Twenty-Fourth
Amendment.125 Legal challenges to political parties’ methods for appointing delegates are not
foreclosed. The Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals, in Bachur v. Democratic National Party, left the
door open to such challenges, despite political parties’ associational rights.126

Opening Primaries to Independent Voters
Whether independent voters may participate in a political party’s presidential primary or
caucus affects how representative a party’s presidential nominee is of constituents. Fully closed
presidential primaries, in which participation is limited to party members, are “skewed to the
parties’ base constituencies,” and often lead to the selection of more partisan presidential
nominees who may be less representative of the party as a whole.127 If independent voters play
no role in the selection of a party’s presidential nominee, it is unlikely that the presidential
nominee selected by either political party will reflect the platform and will of independent
voters.
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1. Existing Proposals
In February 2020, Republican state representatives from Missouri and South Carolina suggested
that the states “close” their presidential primaries to prevent “voting raiding.” They wanted to
prevent Republican voters who felt confident that Trump would become the Republican Party’s
presidential nominee from casting votes in Democratic primary contests aimed at having the
Democrats select a weaker nominee.128 The bill proposed in South Carolina would have limited
voters’ ability to switch party registration, permitting them to shift it no more than once every
two years.129
2. Our Recommendation: Permit Independents and Party Members to Vote in
Primaries
Although proposals to reform presidential primaries should take the possibility of vote raiding
into consideration, closing presidential primaries entirely to independent voters may lead to
the selection of extremely partisan presidential nominees. Additionally, voters may have many
valid reasons for shifting their party membership, and it would be undemocratic and unjust to
prevent voters from shifting their party registration at will.
Presidential primaries should be opened, in some capacity, to independent voters for a number
of reasons. Presidential primaries and caucuses that permit some participation by independent
voters increase voter turnout.130 In states in which independent voters were permitted to
participate in the primaries and caucuses held by both political parties, the average voter
turnout was 38 percent.131 In contrast, in states that held fully closed primaries and caucuses,
the average voter turnout was 18 percent.132 Furthermore, only approximately half of young
voters (aged 18 to 24) register to join either major political party; the rest choose to remain
politically independent.133 States that permit independents to vote in primaries are more likely
to select presidential candidates who address policy issues that affect voters of various ages
and demographics.
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Some states prefer closed primaries and caucuses to prevent vote raiding.134 But if primaries
are opened to independent voters, state political parties have legal authority to take steps to
lower the risk of vote raiding. In the Supreme Court’s decision in California Democratic Party v.
Jones, Justice Scalia reasoned that vote raiding poses a “clear and present danger” in
presidential primaries and leads to the selection of candidates whose views “diverge from
those of the party faithful.”135 In reaching this conclusion, Justice Scalia cited a survey of voters
in California’s blanket primary, which indicated that 37 percent of Republicans planned to vote
in the state’s Democratic gubernatorial primary and 20 percent of Democratic voters planned
to vote in the state’s Republican Senate primary.136 In 1997, two professors at University of
California, Riverside, published a study analyzing exit polls to determine how many voters who
self-identified with one political party “crossed over” to vote in the other political party’s
primary.137 Their study suggested that, in states holding closed presidential primaries, only
approximately two to three percent of voters voting in one party’s primary in states holding
closed presidential primaries identified themselves with the other political party.138
Vote raiding is difficult to study because voters who cross over to the other party’s primary to
choose a weak candidate are unlikely to admit what they are doing to researchers.
Furthermore, politicians, celebrities, or influential party members may attempt to mobilize
vote-raiding movements on a large scale in future presidential primaries.139 States, therefore,
remain concerned about vote raiding and should pass delayed enrollment statutes to prevent
vote-raiding.
In 1973, in Rosario v. Rockefeller, the Supreme Court upheld N.Y. Election Law § 186, New York
State’s delayed enrollment statute.140 Section 186 required voters to register to a party at least
30 days before the general election that preceded the primary in which the voter wished to
vote.141 The Court noted that because the deadline required voters to register to join a political
party before the preceding general election, it was unlikely that the voters would have the
“foresight” to join a political party to engage in vote raiding in a primary that could be a long
way off.142
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The Court held that § 186 did not constitute an unconstitutional burden on voters’ freedom of
association.143 Requiring a delayed enrollment period was permissible because it furthered an
important state goal, inhibiting party “raiding,” and placing a delayed enrollment deadline after
the preceding general election would fail to have the same deterrent effect on party raiding.144
In Tashjian v. Republican Party of Connecticut, the Supreme Court held that, under their First
Amendment right to associate, political parties may open state and federal primaries to
independent voters.145 The Court recognized that it is in a party’s interest to “appeal to the
independent voter” and that permitting independent voters to participate in a presidential
primary will increase the likelihood that the primaries “produce the candidate and platform
most likely to achieve that goal.”146
In Storer v. Brown, the Supreme Court upheld California Elections Code § 6830(d), a provision
that prevented independent candidates in state and federal elections from being included on
ballots if the independent candidate had been affiliated with a political party “within one year
prior to the immediately preceding primary election.”147 The Court, citing Rosario, held that
California Elections Code § 6830(d) “protects the direct primary process” and the “one-year
disaffiliation provision furthers the State’s interest in the stability of its political system.”148
Although Storer directly impacts the rights of independent candidates, and not independent
primary voters, the Court’s holding nonetheless suggests that the Court will give broad
discretion to political parties to regulate or limit the rights of independents seeking to
participate in and affiliate or disaffiliate with them at will.
A similar party disaffiliation requirement should be imposed for voters in primaries, permitting
participation by party members and independent voters who have not been affiliated with
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either major political party since the preceding general election (a period of between four and
seven months, depending on when in the primary calendar a state is holding its primary).
Requiring a period of party disaffiliation for independent voters who wish to participate in a
primary may limit the impact of vote raiding because it is unlikely that voters would be planning
to vote for one party in the general election while simultaneously planning to raid another
party’s election the following year. This independent voter disaffiliation requirement should be
coupled with a delayed enrollment deadline, requiring all voters to register to join a political
party no less than ten weeks prior to a state’s primary. Vote raiding may even be limited in
years in which there is an incumbent president, because voters will likely still want to vote for
other “down-ballot” candidates. As the Supreme Court noted in Tashjian, a party’s decision to
permit independent voters to participate in presidential primaries provides the party with a
“substantial benefit . . . in seeking to choose successful candidates.”149

Ensuring Majority Support for Nominees
Were a candidate to win a primary election without winning a majority of votes, it could lead to
the nomination of a less representative and less popular candidate than could be otherwise
selected.150 A candidate might win a primary without the support of most of the electorate due
to vote splitting, a phenomenon where having multiple ideologically similar candidates running
can decrease the chances of any of them winning.
1. Our Recommendation
The political parties should implement ranked-choice voting (“RCV”) in the primaries. RCV, and
more specifically, instant runoff voting (“IRV”), is a system in which voters pick their first-choice
candidate and then can rank other candidates in order of their preferences. If a candidate
receives more than half of the first choices, that candidate wins. If there is no majority winner
after counting first choices, then the candidate with the fewest votes is eliminated, and voters
who picked that candidate as their first choice will have their votes count for their next choice.
This process continues until a candidate wins with more than half of the votes.151 An IRV ballot
would look like the below example, with voters filling in up to five bubbles in preference order,
filling in at most one per column. In our recommended IRV model, when a candidate receives
50 percent of votes in a given district, he or she wins that district. And if no candidate receives
50 percent of the vote, candidates with the least votes, who would be mathematically unable
to win, are eliminated. After a candidate is eliminated, the votes of those who placed that
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candidate as their first choice go to those voters’ second choice candidate. This process
continues until a winner eventually emerges.
Sample Primary Election Ballot
Rank up to 5 candidates in the order of your preference. Mark no more than 1 oval in each
column.
1st

2nd

3rd

4th

5th

Candidate 1

⬭

⬭

⬭

⬭

⬭

Candidate 2

⬭

⬭

⬭

⬭

⬭

Candidate 3

⬭

⬭

⬭

⬭

⬭

Candidate 4

⬭

⬭

⬭

⬭

⬭

Candidate 5

⬭

⬭

⬭

⬭

⬭

Usually when IRV is implemented, the winner would have also won in a plurality voting system,
receiving more than 50 percent of first choice votes; other times IRV leads to a different winner
from the winner who would have been selected by the plurality system. In cases where IRV
would result in a different winner, the winner ends up being a more representative, less
polarizing candidate. In these cases, IRV leads to the victory of a candidate who ends up
receiving a majority vote, when the plurality candidate would not have. That is what happened
in the 1990 Irish presidential election, which Mary Robinson won with 38.9 percent of the vote,
when Brian Lenihan received 44.1 percent and Austin Currie received 17 percent.152
Critics raise concerns about voter confusion, and question whether voters can sufficiently
understand how IRV works. Another criticism of IRV is that it could lead to the least popular
candidate winning. This seemingly hypothetical issue became a reality in the 2009 Burlington,
Vermont, mayoral election when Bob Kiss won despite being neither the plurality winner nor
the Condorcet victor.153
Another potential drawback of IRV is that it could limit the representation of third-party
candidates and ideological minorities within a party. Under the current system, candidates may
need to make concessions or appeals to third-party voters and ideological minorities in order to
defeat their opponent, allowing these groups to have a degree of influence on policy. Under
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IRV, however, third-party candidates and candidates representing ideological minorities would
likely be eliminated in early tabulations, and voters who ranked them first would have their
votes go to their second-choice candidate, reducing the need for candidates to seriously
consider those voters’ policy preferences.154
But the potential downsides of IRV are outweighed by its numerous advantages. The primary
benefit is the possibility of electing consensus candidates who appeal to a broader range of the
electorate and reducing fracturing within the party. Most importantly, IRV would reduce the
risk of vote splitting, which could lead to the nomination of a candidate who has only won a
plurality of votes and who the majority of voters disfavor. Additionally, IRV can increase voter
turnout, which would help lead to the election of a more representative nominee. IRV also has
been shown to lead to greater civility and less negative campaigning between primary
candidates. A candidate who runs a negative campaign is less likely to be a secondary or tertiary
preference of opposing candidates’ supporters, helping the party ultimately unify and rally
around the eventual nominee.155 IRV could push candidates to focus on the entire electorate,
rather than running campaigns focused on their core supporters.156 IRV has already been
implemented in major elections in several states, such as Nevada, and in many city council and
mayoral elections, with promising results.157

Balancing the Input of Voters and Party Establishments
There are several ways elite party members can influence the outcome of primaries. Mayors,
governors, members of the House of Representatives, senators, influential donors, and other
party insiders can use endorsements, fundraising, and other tactics to shape primary elections.
Additionally, the Democratic and Republican parties permit elected officials from their parties
and other established party members to vote as “superdelegates,” whose votes give the party
establishments a role in the selection of presidential nominees. Because it is unlikely that party
elites would support an unelectable, unqualified, extremist candidate, superdelegates help
ensure that the parties select candidates who are qualified and represent the parties’
platforms. But superdelegates’ role may make it more difficult for a representative candidate
outside the party establishment to prevail, even if the candidate has significant popular
support.
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Depending on the rules the parties use, superdelegates can drastically reduce the role of voters
in the selection of presidential nominees.158 Under the rules the Democratic Party used in 2016,
superdelegates were permitted to “pledge” to support a candidate prior to the Democratic
National Convention.159 Supporters of candidate Bernie Sanders repeatedly called the 2016
system “undemocratic,” citing, for example, the 2016 New Hampshire primary. In that contest,
Sanders won over 60 percent of the popular vote, and Clinton received 38 percent.160 New
Hampshire had 24 pledged delegates, which were awarded based on the popular vote, and six
elected officials voting as superdelegates.161 All six superdelegates voted for Clinton.162 Even
though Sanders won 55,000 more popular votes than Clinton, Sanders and Clinton each
received 15 delegates from the New Hampshire primary.163
Following the 2016 election and outrage from Sanders and his supporters, the Democratic
National Committee voted, nearly unanimously, to prevent superdelegates from voting at the
2020 Democratic National Convention, unless no candidate received a majority of the pledged
delegates to the convention during the presidential primaries and caucuses.164 The rule change
is intended to give the voters, not elected officials and other party elites, the ultimate say in
selecting a presidential nominee.165
1. Existing Proposals
Existing proposals for increasing peer review, which refers to the parties’ ability to impact
nominee selection, include pre-primary endorsements and pre-primary votes of confidence.
Pre-primary endorsements and pre-primary votes of confidence would involve a party
convention held in January of an election year for the party establishment to weigh in on their
prospective presidential candidates. In the pre-primary endorsement model, the candidate with
the most support would receive the party’s endorsement, and candidates failing to receive at
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least 15 percent of votes would be precluded from appearing on the primary ballot.166 A preprimary vote of confidence would have the party take a less decisive role. It would allow the
party to interview the candidates to determine if they were adequately qualified and whether
their ideals corresponded with those of the party.167 Party members could also evaluate
whether each candidate was capable of fulfilling the obligations of the presidency.168 Unlike the
pre-primary endorsement model, however, candidates who did not meet the threshold could
still appear on the parties’ primary ballot, giving the voters, rather than the party, the final say.
But the parties would still have discretion to exclude candidates from the debates, which could
severely hinder a candidate’s campaign.169
2. Our Recommendation: Superdelegate Reform
We endorse the Democratic Party’s pre-2020 superdelegate reform because it strikes a sensible
balance between the party’s discretion and the influence of voters. As discussed, the reform
only allows superdelegates to vote at the Democratic National Convention if no candidate
receives a majority of pledged votes through states’ primaries and caucuses.170 If no candidate
secures a majority of votes, all delegates become unbound, and superdelegates may exert
some influence in selecting a candidate who the party believes is representative, qualified, and
able to prevail in a general election.
Critics of peer review typically object to replacing the voice of the voters with the voice of party
officials, and the 2016 presidential primaries demonstrated that superdelegates may exert so
much influence on presidential primaries that they effectively take the vote away from the
people. Nonetheless, it is appropriate for established party leaders and party members to play
a role in selecting a presidential candidate if primary voters are unable to reach a majority
consensus. Superdelegates can also make it more difficult for an unelectable extremist
candidate to become the party’s nominee, and they can guarantee that a party’s presidential
nominee has some party-wide support. Superdelegates should, however, only play a role in
selecting a presidential nominee after all the states have voted and pledged delegates have
been assigned. The voters should have the first say in selecting a representative and qualified
presidential nominee and, if no candidate has received a majority of pledged delegates, then
elected party members should cast votes as superdelegates.
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III. Implementing Reform
Currently states run their own primaries and political parties run caucuses. However, this
system sows competition between states, even though the competition should be between the
candidates. Because states and state political parties can determine the method and date of
their respective presidential candidate selection process, states are encouraged to battle each
other to the front of the calendar and determine their own rules for voting. Because our
proposed reforms are extensive and would likely disadvantage some states, it is unlikely that
states will willingly agree to surrender their autonomy in this process. Our reforms would not
have their intended effects unless every state implemented them. This Part explores the
potential for a unified, national implementation of our recommendations through
congressional action or pressure from national political parties.

Implementation by National Parties
The national political parties should encourage their state parties to implement the reforms
uniformly. National parties’ ability to control their state and local parties is limited. But if the
national parties are not satisfied with the way state parties run their presidential nominating
conventions, the national parties may refuse to recognize the delegates those state parties
send to the Republican National Convention or the Democratic National Convention.171 It is in
each major political party’s interest to promote the selection of electable, qualified, and
representative presidential nominees.
1. Congressional Action
Congress has authority to regulate national elections under the Constitution’s Article II.172 First,
Congress has the power to determine the time and day on which presidential electors are
chosen.173 Second, Congress has the power to regulate the “Times, Places and Manner” of
elections for senators and representatives in Congress.174 In 1976, the Supreme Court held in
Buckley v. Valeo that “Congress has power to regulate Presidential elections and primaries.”175
Even before Buckley, various Supreme Court cases confirmed Congress’ broad power to
regulate federal elections and primaries.176
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In Burroughs & Cannon v. United States, petitioners, who had failed to comply with
bookkeeping requirements of the Federal Corrupt Practices Act, challenged Congress’s
authority to regulate presidential elections.177 The Court disagreed with plaintiff’s contention,
and held that it was critical for Congress to have some authority to regulate presidential
elections.178 In the majority opinion, Justice Sutherland wrote:
To say that Congress is without power to pass appropriate legislation to
safeguard such an election from the improper use of money to influence the
result is to deny to the nation in a vital particular the power of self-protection.
Congress, undoubtedly, possesses that power, as it possesses every other
power essential to preserve the departments and institutions of the general
government from impairment or destruction . . .179
The Court confirmed Congress’s authority to regulate primary elections a few years later, in
United States v. Classic.180 Where primary elections are integral to the selection of a candidate
in the general election, the Court held that congressional authority over the general election
includes the authority to regulate primaries.181 The Court extended its constitutional
interpretation of Congress’ authority over presidential elections in Oregon v. Mitchell;182 citing
Classic, the Court stated that the authority “to enact the numerous requirements as to
procedure and safeguards which experience shows are necessary in order to enforce the [the
right to vote]” was “augmented” by the Necessary and Proper Clause.183
There are, of course, counterarguments to the contention that Congress has the authority to
regulate presidential primaries, namely that congressional action would interfere with the
parties’ First Amendment right to political association.184 In considering the parties’ right to
political association, courts would look to whether there is a compelling interest that outweighs
this right.185 Some compelling interests might include “protecting the opportunity of voters in
all states to participate in the election of the national leader, preserving the opportunity of
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candidates to compete for the presidency, and preserving the legitimacy of the office, the
electoral process, and the political system.”186

IV. Conclusion
The president leads the entire country, not merely the states he or she won in the election or
factions of his or her political party. Furthermore, presidents must have the qualifications
needed to effectively discharge the office’s responsibilities. Accordingly, our recommendations
aim to reform the primaries to allow the parties to nominate the most representative and
qualified candidates as possible.
The primary calendar reform aims to give each state a more equal say in selecting nominees,
rather than allowing some early voting states to set the trajectory for the race while leaving
later voting states out of the equation. Reforming debates would create an effective platform
to inform the public. The elimination of caucuses and opening of primaries to independent
voters would ensure that those who want to support candidates for the nomination can have
their voices heard. The IRV proposal would make primary nominees respond to a broader swath
of the electorate and unify their party, rather than doubling down on appealing to their core
supporters. The superdelegate reform would allow the party establishments to still play a
crucial role if needed, without overshadowing the will of the people.
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